Recent 
The other 121 members of the Constitutional Assembly are specially elected to this body from each of Dagestan's 121 Assembly districts. Ware and Kisriev, 1999a , 2000a .
Until 2000, representatives to the People's Assembly were successfully elected by means of an elaborate ethnic electoral system Ware and Kisriev, 1999a , 2000a . In order to avoid ethnic conflicts, provide ethnic proportionality, and reduce thesalience of ethnicity as a campaign issue, 66 electoral districts that were located in multiethnic areas were designated by the Dagestani Electoral Commission as ethnic electoral districts.
In these districts only candidates of the designated ethnicity could stand for election. The remaining 55 districts were in mono-ethnic regions, predominantly in the highlands. Residency requirements were dropped so that candidates could seek office in any district corresponding with their ethnicity. This system, which was widely regarded as equitable and legitimate, provided representation in the Assembly for each ethnic group often within a few tenths of a percentage point of it representation in the broader population districts Ware and Kisriev, 1999a , 2000a . However, beginning in 2000 the People's Assembly enacted legislation altering the Republic's electoral system, due in part to central influence .
Central control over Dagestani structures has been rapidly increasing. Following recent efforts by the Kremlin to recentralize the Russian political system, a wide range of Dagestan's political institutions and practices have became the focus of judicial and executive pressures applied upon Dagestani officials from the federal center. Dagestan's collegial executive and its ethnic electoral districts were challenged in Russia's Constitutional Court, and Dagestani officials found Moscow signaling in a variety of ways that Dagestan's entire political structure must be modified ).
Regional autonomy is giving way to uniform practice and centralized means of control, illustrated by the seven new federal districts patterned upon the top-down organization of the Russian military. Like other regional elites, Dagestani officials remain uncertain of their position within this new federal structure. Yet while the full implications of this reorganization remain unclear the process has already had significant effects in Dagestan.
What effect will Russian recentralizing trends have upon regional stability in the Caspian? Will current efforts to bend Dagestani institutions to fit a federal mold have a destabilizing effect? The current Dagestani system is the result of a lengthy historical process of political evolution that has extended informally over centuries in response to constant power clashes and complex counter-balancing forces, none of which can be readily eliminated from the political scene . Since Moscow cannot hope to modify the localized internal pressures that have produced this system and that successfully have been channeled within it, will externally imposed modifications prove to be counterproductive?
As it happened, we were conducting a field research project in Dagestan during the spring and summer of 2000 just as President Putin's recentralization program was getting under way. Since the study was proposed in 1998 and funded in early 1999, before Putin ascended to power, it was not focused upon issues of recentralization. Among other things, however, the study was intended to examine Dagestani attitudes toward the Republic's democratic institutions, toward Russia, and toward threats to Dagestan's stability. Hence, while the fieldwork did not directly address issues of recentralization, and while the full spectrum of data is presented in a series of articles, 3 survey and interview data on Dagestani attitudes toward governments in Moscow and Mahachkala, and to relations between them, taken at the beginning of the federal recentralization program may nevertheless shed some light upon the preceding questions concerning the potential effects of Russian recentralization upon stability in Dagestan.
The present article is divided among four sections. The first two sections are intended to provide an introduction to the issues involved by sampling two of the complex problems, respectively concerning electoral practices and ethnic rights, that have been raised as recent centralizing pressures have confronted Dagestan's unique political practices. The third section presents survey and interview data on Dagestani attitudes toward issues relevant to Russian recentralization, and the final section presents our concluding thoughts.
Electoral Alternations
The According to the new plan, blocks of candidates appear on the ballot of each district.
Candidates from the ethnicities that need special proportional representation are gathered in "monoethnic" blocks, while the rest of the candidates are gathered in a section of miscellaneous "others". The candidates that win a majority of votes in their particular blocks are considered the winners. Thus, within the framework of a single ballot candidates compete within electoral lists that may be specified on an ethnic basis. This approach is intended to sustain proportionate representation throughout Dagestan's legislative bodies. changes when he took his claims of electoral ethnic discrimination before the Russian Constitutional Court. Yet this complaint was against the ethnic basis of the electoral system as a whole, and not against the outcome of any particular election. Thus the new system might actually lead to more complaints, and to complaints of a more contentious nature, than the old.
Previously, ethnic electoral districts were established well in advance of elections, and only candidates of the specified ethnicity were registered. Since one of these was ultimately elected there were no surprises of an ethnic nature, and an election itself was unlikely to be challenged on grounds of ethnic discrimination. The new system seems likely to produce challenges to the results of particular elections, which are consequently likely to produce diminished consensus and legitimacy.
The new system also encounters issues of identity. Since the new Russian passports do not designate the ethnicity of their holder how will ethnic identity be determined in equivocal cases? While this might also have posed problems for the previous system, it is significant that the old method of predetermined ethnic electoral districts, which required that all candidates should be from the same group, served to minimize the electoral salience of ethnic identity. importantly, on linguistic grounds that they qualify for consideration as "small ethnic groups".
For example, in addition to those "proper" Avars, who speak the Avar language, 14 other linguistically independent ethnic groups are also considered administratively as "Avars". These groups, which tend to be compactly accommodated in high mountain villages, are as follows: (1) Andis, (2) Archins, (3) Akhvakhs, (4) Bagulals, (5) Bezhtins, (6) Botlikhs, (7) Genukhs, (8) Godaberins, (9) Gunzibs, (10) Didoys, (11) Many of these problems arise from the fact that the true ethnic structure of Dagestani society is constituted, not by ethnicities, but by smaller structures known as djamaats (Ware and Kisriev, 199b, 2000a; Ware, 2002) . A djamaat is a village, or an historically connected group of villages, each of which is composed of several tuhums, or clans. The djamaat has territorial, ethno-cultural, and kinship bases. Historically, Dagestani djamaats were compact, densely populated, well-fortified hamlets that controlled their surrounding countryside. These separate "city-states" had their own distinctive civil laws, know as djamaat adati. In the nineteenth century there were approximately 350 to 400 djamaats.
The traditional "free societies", "principalities", and "khanates" that were described by Russians when they first arrived in the region were generally "molecular" aggregations of Dagestan's "atomic" socio-political units, or djamaats. In some cases these unions among djamaats were voluntary, and in some cases they were forced. The form of local government often varied with the geography. In the mountains "federal republics" or "unions of free societies" were the norm, whereas the plains and foothills were often home to more authoritarian regimes.
Today, in several cases, such traditional aggregations of djamaats, could make credible claims for independent ethnic status. They display various degrees of linguistic differentiation, from dialects to genuinely separate languages. Additionally, the members of each occupy a compact, well-delineated territory. They share a common political history and distinctive cultural traditions of both a material and spiritual nature. Most importantly, they share an explicit identification with their society or community, which members retain even when they depart their djamaat for the life of the cities.
In light of these considerations, the law on small ethnicities appears as a throwback to the Ethnic rights and electoral practices are but two of the ways in which Russian recentralization has recently affected Dagestan's political practices. Elsewhere we have discussed amendments to Dagestan's constitution and the institution of the federal inspector . The imposition of these federal reforms could produce substantial changes in Dagestan's political system. Would they be likely to encounter popular resistance?
How do Dagestani citizens view their political system? What are their attitudes toward Dagestan, toward Russia, and toward federal leadership? Are they likely to regard Moscow's growing control as a threat to their hard-won stability?
Field Research
Our fieldwork was underway at the time that these reforms began and the results provide a snapshot of relevant Dagestani attitudes at the commencement of the recentralization process.
Because recentralization was not a key issue in 1998, when the project was designed the topic was not a focus of formal hypotheses. Yet preliminary fieldwork by two of the authors had led to the realization that many Dagestanis regarded themselves as being more closely affiliated with the Russian Federation than some observers in the West, or in Moscow, had recongnized. By the beginning of the survey it would not have been difficult to predict that this relationship would grow even closer.
It appeared, at the outset of this study, that there were essentially three reasons for Dagestan's increasing closeness to Moscow. First, in contrast with some other Caucasian republics, the Dagestani outlook is characterized by attitudes of pragmatism, toleration, moderation, and a multiethnic identity (Ware and Kisriev, 2000a, 2001a highlands. In the second phase of selection, individual respondents were selected from voter registration lists in the sites that were chosen in the first phase.
5
In order to provide a qualitative supplement to the quantitative survey data, the study involved 40 open-ended interviews with members of Dagestan's professional, scientific, and creative intelligentsia. 6 Due to issues of infrastructure and security, the accessibility and cooperation of the respondents were critical factors in the selection of the sample. Hence, while 4 Evangelista provides a critical survey of such claims. 5 The lists are compiled by electoral commissions and include all people 18 years and older who are who officially are registered as residing in each area. Random selection from these lists was accomplished according to a "step method". The size of the "step" was determined by dividing the total number of names on any given list by the number of respondents required from that area. As a consequence, the size of the "step" varied, but generally it was greater than 12. In a case, for example, where the "step" was 14, we contacted every 14 th person on the list. In the event of the unavailability of, or refusal by, one of these selectees, the next person on the list was contacted. Randomizing features of this method generally yielded samples that were proportionate to demographic data with respect to age and gender. However, random sampling in many Dagestani villages, conducted at virtually any time, is likely to lead to over-representation of women, as many men go to cities for purposes of employment. Therefore it was necessary to compensate by sampling in urban areas that was further stratified with respect to gender, so as to balance the number of men in the survey in accord with demographic data. When interpreting the tabular data that follow it must be borne in mind that data for villages are disproportionately female, and data for towns are disproportionately male. While the overall response rate was 71 percent, some items from completed surveys contain missing values, which are not always randomly distributed. , and was compiled in a series of articles and papers Ware, 1999, 2001a,b; Ware and Kisriev, 1999b , 2000a ,b, 2001a ,b, 2002a .
In a place like Dagestan, there are a great many impediments to empirical research.
Western survey methodologies are challenged by the extremity of cultural and infrastructural obstacles. Telephone interviewing is impossible as many Dagestanis, and most villagers, lack telephones, traveling for face-to-face interviews is difficult and often dangerous. Any tradition of being interrogated on political issues solely for scientific purposes is lacking, and political inquiry in Dagestan invariably encounters reticence on the part of some respondents to speak openly on issues of controversy. In addition, local cultures must be given consideration if responses are to be elicited at all. These difficulties were surmounted at the cost of a somewhat inelaborate set of variables for which survey and interview data could be obtained. As a consequence, data analysis had to be broadly descriptive in nature.
7 Though the data do not meet 6 Those interviews were conducted orally according to a prepared list of 28 questions, and were recorded on tape with permission or otherwise stenographed. 7 In the tables, data will be broken down for Dagestan's most important ethnic groups. For these two groups, cross-border ethnic ties are of great importance. This is not as markedly the case for either Azeris or Lezgins, though both groups have large populations of ethnic kin in
Azerbaijan. Yet, after Chechens, ethnic identification is most important to Azeris and Lezgins respectively. For Chechens, ethnic identity, religious identity, village identification are also of striking importance. This is Dagestan's least integrated ethnic group.
Recent changes in socio-cultural, political and economic life are considered to be critical by many Dagestanis. Table 2 shows that respondents regarded the worst changes to have occurred in the economy, followed by politics and socio-cultural life. 9 These results are not unique, and can be found in most of the successors of former socialist states. Answers were coded as follows: Performance of the institution is good (1), satisfactory (2), and bad (3). Displaying only median values would hide much of the variation, which actually is in the data. Therefore means are shown, although data have not been measured on a well-tested interval scale.
Of greater importance, however, is the fact that very large percentages of the population is dissatisfied with all political institutions. This suggests that in Dagestan state institutions are not creating stability so much as consuming stability generated elsewhere. Nor is satisfaction higher with political parties and social movements. On balance, they are ranked low with a mean of 2.53. This underscores the significance of religion. Religious organizations receive the highest evaluation with a mean of 2.11. Table 5 shows those ethnic groups that were either relatively high or relatively low in their rankings of these institutions. Some of the causes of Chechen alienation are well known, but it would be impossible to overstate the significance of their brutal deportation to Kazakhstan in February 1944. They were not officially rehabilitated until 1957 and most have still not been able to return to their historic villages in Dagestan. This is because Laks and Avars were forcibly resettled into those villages in March 1944, and they can no longer return to their remote and delapidated highland homes.
The Laks had agreed to move to less desireable land northwest of Mahachkala, but ironically the invasions of 1999 interfered with their relocation, and it is now uncertain that they will move (Kisriev and Ware, 2000) . Since some Dagestanis regard many Chechen-Akhins to have been complicit in those invasions, the latter are now an out group. For all of these reasons, Chechens are unlikely to be satisfied with their prospects in Dagestan or in Russia.
Moreover, Chechen social structure differs substanially from that of other Dagestani groups in the greater emphasis that it places upon kinship structures, and the relative weakness of political structures (Ware and Kisriev, 1999b , 2000a Ware) . This helps to account for the greater emphasis that Chechens place upon ethnic and religious referents in table 1. Like Avars and Dargins, Chechens are also traditionally more likely to have deep attachments to Islam than are other of Dagestan's Islamic ethnicities.
There is no simple solution for the problems faced by either Lezgins or Chechen-Akhins, and in many respects the situations of both groups show signs of deterioration. For example, some young men in both groups are turning toward Islamist Wahhabism. Each group is likely to represent a potential source of instability for the foreseeable future.
The survey asked respondents to whom they would "trust in the event of an acute crisis", permitting more than one response.
12 For a majority of Dagestanis, Russia is the second most important source of identity. Yet given the history of the Caucasus, it nevertheless seems remarkable that in case of an acute crisis most Dagestanis would trust in Russian Federal leadership (table 6) Five interviewees identified problems with Russia as the primary threat, but one of these was most concerned about the "lack of coordination between the Federation and the Republic,"
suggesting the need for closer relations with Moscow. On the other hand, two respondents saw "Russian instability" as the primary external threat; one focused upon the "politics of Russia"; one saw a threat in "Russia's mistrust of Dagestan's loyalty," and one saw the primary threat in "Russian chauvinism".
Three interviewees were most concerned about "Western influence", with one focusing upon "foreign culture, music, pornography", and another concerned about competition over Most interviewees thought that the greatest internal threat to Dagestan's stability was economic. Three of these focused upon "poverty in Dagestan", while another described Dagestan's "economic backwardness", and two more were alarmed by "unemployment" and a growing "economic crisis". Six were most concerned about the increasing polarization of rich and poor.
Eleven respondents saw internal political issues as the greatest threat to Dagestan's stability. Five interviewees mentioned "corruption", "theft of power", or "bad leaders"; one described the "monopolization of power"; two concentrated upon the "struggle for power" or "change of leadership"; and two thought that the main problem lay in the imperfection of the electoral system.
Another ten respondents attributed the main problems to ethnic or kinship ties. Three of these talked about the "confrontation of clans"; three were most concerned about "ethnic nationalism"; one focused upon "ethnic separatism"; and one saw a threat in the "dominance of one ethnic group". Finally, one interviewee saw a threat in Dagestan's "lack of a national identity or concept". Answers were coded: closer (-1), status quo (0), and more independent (1). So a negative value of the mean stands for the wish of a closer relationship between Russia and Dagestan.
Northern Exposure
Clearly a key to the interpretation of this data is Dagestani perceptions of the current economic crisis combined with the remarkable trust that they are prepared to place in federal officials at critical junctures. These expectations are unlikely to have been disappointed by Moscow's recent economic support for the Republic.
Partly as a consequence of its role in the current Chechen conflict, Dagestan continues to receive substantial financial support from the center, accounting for more than 80 percent of the transfers, and subsidiary economic development associated with the exploitation of Caspian reserves.
As compared with Astrakhan, Mahachkala makes some geographical sense for Turkmen products, but it is more surprising to see tankers from Kazakhstan pulling into Mahachkala's docks. There appear to be at least three related reasons for Moscow's interest in Mahachkala's increasing hydrocarbon traffic. Indeed, in times of crisis they would trust in federal authorities more than in anyone else, including their personal circles.
These data provide tentative insights into questions raised by this study. Many Dagestanis may welcome increasing central control in so far as it efficacious in addressing current crises.
That is, they may accept central control in so far as it is sufficiently comprehensive and consistent to stimulate economic development, reduce corruption, and institute the rule of law.
In the absence of such improvements, an unceremonious, arbitrary, or partial alteration of political structures, including a cancellation of ethnic electoral districts, interference with Dagestan's collegial executive, or the forced implementation of a presidential system, will have at least a potentially destabilizing effect.
Thus far, Moscow has been well advised to proceed slowly in Dagestan, to demand no more than moderate changes, and to allow Dagestani leaders ample room for compromise 
